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This article explains the rule that leases have a certain term from the outset by 
placing the lease within the wider context of the system of estates in land. There are 
no perpetual estates in land. However, some uncertain terms risk creating genuinely 
perpetual estates, conflicting with the nemo dat principle. All leases for uncertain 
terms cause considerable difficulties if a superior estate comes to an end. The article 
shows that the common law addressed this difficulty, not entirely consistently, 
before 1925, but there are still real difficulties in the operation of escheat were 
uncertain terms to be permitted.  
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EXPLAINING THE CERTAINTY OF TERM REQUIREMENT IN LEASES:  
NOTHING LASTS FOREVER  
Ian Williams*  
 
The requirement that a valid term of years estate has a term which is certain from the 
outset is well-established. So are the criticisms of the rule.1 In the recent Supreme 
Court case of Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Berrisford the rule was strongly 
criticised.2 The Justices cited Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
London Residuary Body, where the rule was described as “bizarre” and merely an 
“ancient and technical rule of law”,3 a complaint exacerbated by Lord Neuberger’s 
observation that the rule has “no apparent practical justification”.4 The application of 
the rule can easily be avoided by granting a lease for a certain term with an 
additional uncertain determining condition,5 and seems to be particularly 
problematic in relation to periodic tenancies, where there is clearly no maximum 
duration for a tenant’s occupation of the premises.6 Typically, the cases in which the 
certainty of term rule arises are ones in which the parties have deliberately tried to 
                                                     
* Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, UCL. My thanks to the participants in the Faculty Research Seminar for 
their comments, Rob Chambers and the anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft. The 
usual disclaimer applies.   
1 The fullest expositions are S. Bright, “Uncertainty in leases – Is it a vice?” (1993) 13 Legal Studies 38 
and K. Gray and S.F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed. (Oxford 2008), 321-326.  
2 Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Berrisford [2011] UKSC 52, [2012] 1 A.C. 955, at [34] (Lord 
Neuberger) and [115] (Lord Dyson).  
3 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 A.C. 386, at 396.  
4 Mexfield at [34].  
5 Prudential Assurance at 390. One risk here is in altering the nature of the proposed arrangement. 
While Lord Templeman suggested the parties could have created a five or ten year term determinable 
on the land being needed for road widening, it seems likely that the short-term arrangement 
envisaged by the parties was not intended to last even that long.  
6 Mexfield at [87]-[88] (Lady Hale).  
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enter into unusual arrangements,7 or situations of poor conveyancing where the 
problem could easily have been avoided.8 This article will show that the rule does 
have a plausible doctrinal underpinning, addressing issues which continue to be 
relevant, although they were more prominent earlier in the history of the common 
law. It also highlights practical difficulties from allowing the grant of uncertain 
terms, difficulties which have been hitherto overlooked.  
Underlying the criticism of the certainty of term rule is the tension in the law 
of leases between the foundation of leases in contractual arrangements and their 
existence as property rights. From the perspective of contract, the certainty of term 
rule conflicts with the parties’ contractual freedom, arbitrarily preventing people 
from entering into arrangements which they consider beneficial. This article seeks to 
place the certainty of term rule into a proprietary context. As Low notes, “It would 
be fanciful to suggest that a purely contractual lease of uncertain duration is illegal or 
otherwise contrary to public policy; all of the justifications for the fixed maximum 
duration rule are obviously directed at the lease as an estate”.9  
Contractual freedom is limited in the sphere of property rights. Most 
obviously, the nemo dat principle prevents someone giving away property rights 
which the donor does not have, whatever their contractual intentions. More 
specifically, parties may agree to create rights which they intend to be proprietary, 
but if those rights do not satisfy the requirements of one of the property rights 
recognised within the numerus clausus, any such grant will fail to create a property 
right. The parties are free to create contractual rights between themselves, and will 
do so, but these rights do not have proprietary effect. The certainty of term rule 
                                                     
7 Say v Smith (1563) Plowd 269; 75 ER 410 seems to fall into this category. The lease in question 
involved periodic payments to be made after each ten year period and was described as “perpetual”. 
For problems with perpetual renewability and the statutory approach to the problem, see M. 
Pawlowski and J. Brown, “Perpetually renewable leases – a reappraisal” [2014] Conveyancer 482.  
8 Prudential Assurance is an example.  
9 K.F.K. Low, “Leases and the fixed maximum duration rule yet again, but with a twist” (2011) 127 
L.Q.R. 31, at 35.  
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should be understood as tied to the place of leases within the common law of real 
property, rather than simply as a species of contract.  
Maintaining the certainty of term rule has been described by Hansmann and 
Kraakman as a consequence of “a natural tendency toward doctrinal scholasticism 
among courts and legal scholars”.10 It is thus apposite that it seems to be a 
consequence of the inclusion of the leasehold estate in the complicated medieval 
thought surrounding the wider system of estates in land. This article stresses that 
“our land law has its roots in the feudal past”.11 While the rule does operate as a bar 
to contractual freedom, it does so as a consequence of the contracting parties trying 
to create proprietary rights which must fit within that wider system.   
This explanation for the certainty of term rule does not mean that it remains 
justified in terms of policy or practicality. Basic property law rules can be avoided, 
exceptions can be made, the wider context may have changed such that the rule no 
longer applies. Despite its justification, there may be good reasons to amend or 
abolish the rule, or equally good reasons to maintain it. However, for the abolition of 
the rule to be doctrinally consistent, and to avoid some awkward consequences, 
wider changes affecting the system of estates in land will be required.  
 
I. PERPETUAL LEASES AND UNCERTAIN TERMS 
An essential starting point is the observation made by Bright and Gray and Gray, 
that a lease for an uncertain term might last forever, imposing a potentially 
indefinite burden on the land.12 The nature of a term of years as originating in 
contract weakens this objection. The owner in fee simple clearly has the power to 
subject himself, his heirs and assigns to long running obligations or to deprive 
himself and his heirs of the benefit of the property in perpetuity by transferring it 
                                                     
10 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, “Property, Contract, and Verification: the Numerus Clausus 
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights” (2002) 31 Journal of Legal Studies S373, at S403.  
11 M. Dixon, “The past, the present and the future of land registration” [2013] Conveyancer 463.  
12 Bright, “Uncertainty in leases”, p.49 (considering this to be a policy issue); Gray and Gray, Elements 
of Land Law, p.325 (identifying a possible conflict with the “perpetual” nature of the fee simple).  
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away. Why not allow potentially indefinite leasehold burdens over the fee simple 
estate? The certainty of term rule seems to be undermined by (and itself undermines) 
freedom of contract.13 However, any lease which were to last forever would 
contravene the nemo dat principle as there are no estates at common law which last 
forever.14. Nemo dat is a recognised limitation on freedom of contract, in that a non-
owner cannot give ownership, even if that is what was agreed in the contract.15  
For many leases with uncertain terms, this is the core of the problem 
addressed by the uncertain term rule. Rather than simply being an objection to terms 
which have only the potential to last forever, the rule prevents the creation of 
leaseholds where the estate might become genuinely perpetual, which is a 
consequence of the common law’s approach to determinable estates.  
If a grant of land were made “to X in fee simple until X marries”, such a grant 
would be a determinable fee simple estate. If X marries, the estate determines 
automatically. If X dies unmarried, the determining event becomes impossible. The 
estate ceases to be a determinable fee, becoming a fee simple absolute.16 The same 
applies if instead of a determinable fee, the estate is a fee simple upon condition 
subsequent.17 If the condition becomes impossible, the estate becomes absolute.18 In 
essence, if an estate’s duration is to be determined by an uncertain event, if the 
uncertain event becomes impossible then the estate becomes perpetual.  
                                                     
13 Bright, “Uncertainty in leases”, p.45.  
14 See below, text at nn.40-41. Uncertain or perpetual leases are possible if the lease is not granted out 
of a freehold estate, but directly by the Crown, see below n.78.  
15 There are, of course, exceptions to the nemo dat principle (see D. Sheehan, The Principles of Personal 
Property Law (Oxford 2011), 426-7), but nemo dat remains the explanatory principle here.  
16 Re Leach [1912] 2 Ch. 422 at 428-9. The case concerned equitable rights, but the logic is applicable to 
legal rights too. Challis considers this a general rule applicable to all estates (H.W. Challis, The Law of 
Real Property: chiefly in relation to conveyancing, 2nd ed. (London 1892), p.227).  
17 Distinguishing between the two types of estate is difficult, see C. Harpum, S. Bridge and M. Dixon 
(eds.), Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property, 8th ed. (London 2012), 64-65. The distinction is less 
important in relation to leasehold estates as the principal practical consequence (the requirement of 
entry to determine a conditional fee) does not apply in relation to leaseholds, see L.A. Goodeve, The 
Modern Law of Real Property, 5th ed., H.W. Elphinstone and F.T. Maw (eds.) (London 1906), p.195.  
18 Darley v Langworthy (1774) 3 Bro. PC 359; 1 E.R. 1369. A widow’s life estate on condition that she 
continued to reside in the premises became absolute when it became impossible to fulfil the 
condition.  
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The same logic should also apply to leases for an uncertain term. If a 
hypothetically valid lease were granted “to X until X marries”, the determining 
condition for the lease might become impossible, as X may die unmarried. Given 
that no other term is specified for which the term of years estate will endure if X dies 
unmarried, it seems that the “lease” which has been granted is not subject to any 
term at all.19 However, a grant of a lease cannot be made to last forever, as this 
would be the grant of a leasehold estate greater than any freehold estate held by the 
landlord and breach the nemo dat principle.20 The law would either need to allow 
such leases to be valid until the determining condition becomes impossible (at which 
point the leasehold estate definitely contravenes the nemo dat principle) or simply 
regard such leases as void from the outset, which is the position taken in the 
certainty rule.  
Understanding the rule as related to the common law’s approach to 
determinable estates addresses two of the concerns raised about the certainty of term 
requirement. The first is that the rule is easily avoided by granting a long lease 
subject to a determining condition.21 If the certainty of term rule is directed, at least 
in part, to preventing the possibility of genuinely perpetual leasehold estates, then 
long but determinable leases avoid the mischief to which the rule is directed. A lease 
simply for an uncertain term might become perpetual and thereby contravene the 
nemo dat principle. A long lease subject to a determining condition cannot become a 
perpetual estate as a fixed maximum duration has been agreed.  
The second criticism is its relationship to fetters on determining periodic 
tenancies by notice.22 Fetters on notice for defined periods seem to be acceptable, but 
fetters which are temporally uncertain are not. For example, in Breams Property 
Investment Co Ltd v Stroulger, a quarterly periodic tenancy with a term that notice 
                                                     
19 If the approach to construction taken in Bracton were taken, this would be construed as a 
determinable freehold life estate (see below, text at nn.30-31).  
20 See below, text at nn.40-41.  
21 Bright, “Uncertainty in leases”, p.39.  
22 Bright, “Uncertainty in leases”, pp.41-2.  
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could not be given by the landlord for three years is acceptable and compatible with 
the certainty of term requirement.23 However, a fetter on determining a periodic 
tenancy by notice which is temporally uncertain, such as that in Berrisford itself, falls 
foul of the certainty of term rule.24  
The explanation for this distinction is found in the certainty of term 
requirement, once the nature of such restrictions is understood. As Lord Neuberger 
and Lady Hale observe, the restriction on the landlord’s right to give notice in 
Breams “turned the quarterly tenancy into a three-year term terminable by the tenant 
on notice before that, to be followed by a normal quarterly tenancy after that”.25 This 
approach explains why an uncertain fetter on the right to determine by notice is 
unacceptable. A fetter on determination of a periodic tenancy creates two tenancies, 
a fixed term followed by a periodic tenancy.26 The fixed term established by the fetter 
on notice is governed by all the usual rules about fixed term tenancies. If such a term 
is uncertain, it contravenes the certainty of term rule in the same way as any other 
non-periodic tenancy. The fact that the tenancy is to be followed by a periodic 
tenancy is irrelevant. As Lord Neuberger observed, once one accepts the certainty of 
term rule, this is “justified in principle, logical in theory”.27 
Nemo dat therefore explains why leases making reference to uncertain 
determining conditions or conditions for notice which may become impossible 
cannot be made. However, it does not explain why leases cannot be made by 
reference to determining conditions which, while uncertain, cannot become 
impossible. A grant of a lease “for the duration of the war” would seem to fall into 
this category. While the duration of a war is uncertain at the onset of hostilities and a 
conflict may persist for some time, the end of a war will never truly become 
                                                     
23 Breams Property Investment Co Ltd v Stroulger [1948] 2 KB 1.  
24 Mexfield at [33] (Lord Neuberger).  
25 Mexfield at [88] (Lady Hale). The same point is made by Lord Templeman in Prudential Assurance v 
London Residuary Body at 395.  
26 The possible formalities consequences of this reasoning were not raised in Mexfield. Lord 
Neuberger’s description of the situation as “equivalent to” a fixed term tenancy avoids the problem 
(Mexfield at [55]).  
27 Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Berrisford at [55].  
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impossible. It is always possible for a war to end by agreement or the destruction of 
one of the parties to it. As an explanation for the certainty of term rule, the general 
rules about determinable estates are inadequate, although may be relevant. Stronger 
justifications can be found.  
 
II. GRANTS OF LAND IN MEDIEVAL LAW 
A particular difficulty in explaining the certainty of term rule is that it is so long 
established that cases on the issue recognise, rather than justify, its existence. This 
probably reflects, at least in part, long-established practice. Conveyances of land for 
certain periods can be seen in the mid-twelfth century, before the common law of 
real property began to develop under Henry II.28 The earliest clear evidence of 
something like the certainty of term rule dates from the thirteenth century.  
According to the book known as Bracton, medieval English law recognised grants of 
land in fee, as a freehold life estate or for a “term certain”. This list excludes the 
possibility of an uncertain term, but any explanation for the exclusion, and the 
certainty of term rule, is lacking.29  
Bracton does consider what would occur if land were granted without a 
certain term. In medieval law, identifying which right in land had been granted 
depended crucially upon the form of the grant when expressing the duration of the 
right. A grant made to X and X’s heirs would be a grant in fee, a grant to X for life 
would be a freehold life estate and a grant to X for a set time would be a grant for a 
term of years.30 Bracton raises the issue of a grant of land which does not comply 
with any of those forms. According to Bracton, “[i]f the donor makes a gift…no 
mention made of the donee's heirs or that it is for his life, the thing so given will be a 
free tenement as long as the donee lives, for to give in this manner is the equivalent 
                                                     
28 J.M. Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge 2009), 254-255.   
29 E.g. S.E. Thorne (ed.), Bracton on the law and customs of England (Cambridge MA 1968), vol.2, p.92.  
30 It is made clear in Bracton, vol.2, p.57 that a grant for the term of life takes effect as a free tenement, 
unlike a term of years. Medieval law did sometimes use the language of lessor and lessee for life 
interests seemingly granted as term of years, but the estates were freehold (see T. Littleton, Littleton’s 
Tenures in English, E. Wambugh (ed.) (Washington D.C. 1903), §57 (p.25)). 
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of giving for life”.31 This is immediately followed by, and contrasted to, a reference 
to the grant of land “for a term of years”. Any grant of land made without reference 
to a certain term or the grantee’s heirs would necessarily be a life estate.  
This appears to be a question not of rules about certainty of term, but rather of 
construction. Any attempt to grant land without a specified duration would be 
construed as a grant for life. This makes sense as a matter of language. If I give land 
to X, I intend for X to have it. If I do not say that I wish for anyone else (X’s heirs) to 
have the land too, presumably I intended only for X to have the land, especially in a 
context where it was well-established that grants to a donee and his heirs needed to 
be made explicitly.  
This approach to construction also makes sense within the remedial context of 
medieval law. The grant of a term of years was not the grant of a free tenement, 
unlike the grant of a fee simple or a freehold life estate.32 In the fifteenth century it 
became clear that the grantee of a term of years received a different type of right 
over the land than the tenant in fee simple or for life. The latter were seised and had 
seisin, the former had only possession.33 This explained why the grantee of a term of 
years did not have a “free tenement” and was not able to use the assize of novel 
disseisin nor any other real actions.34 Except against his landlord’s successors in title, 
a tenant for term of years had only remedies in damages.35 An approach to 
construction which found a freehold life estate was consequently one which 
favoured the grantee. It was only when the grantor made it clear that the grant in 
question was a worse right, the term of years, that the grantee was denied access to 
the real actions.36  
                                                     
31 Bracton, vol.2, p.92.  
32 Bracton, vol.2, p.92.  
33 The language of seisin was used more flexibly in earlier periods, see F.W. Maitland, “The Seisin of 
Chattels” (1885) 1 L.Q.R. 324.  
34 Bracton, vol.2, p.92.  
35 See Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, pp.299-301. The position changed from the late-
fifteenth century.  
36 This paragraph suggests that the description of the “rule” applied by the Supreme Court in Mexfield 
at [49], [50] and [54] was mistaken in several respects. The Supreme Court held that there was a 
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It is not clear whether the rule originated as one of substance with the 
approach to construction outlined above being simply a consequence of it, or 
whether the approach to construction came first. Even if the rule was initially only 
one of construction, it would have substantive consequences. The interpretative 
approach found in Bracton would render it impossible to grant a lease for an 
uncertain term.  The idea of an uncertain term of years would simply have been 
inconceivable and the common law would therefore only recognise grants of land 
for certain terms.  
An explanation for the certainty of term rule based on construction has lost its 
force in modern law. The approach to construction of a grant “to X” found in Bracton 
no longer applies, as section 60(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 means that the 
grant would be construed as one in fee simple, unless a contrary intention appeared 
by the conveyance.37 The remedial basis for the Bracton construction has also been 
lost: the same actions have been used to recover freehold and leasehold land for 
centuries.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
common law rule that an attempt to grant a lease to a living human being for an uncertain period 
failed, but instead created a lease for life, which is now converted by the Law of Property Act 1925, s. 
149(6) into a lease for ninety years, determinable on the tenant’s death. The statement of the common 
law rule in this process is flawed (for similar, but not identical criticism, see K.F.K. Low, “Certainty of 
Terms and Leases: Curiouser and Curiouser” (2012) 75(3) M.L.R. 401 at 404-406). First, Bracton 
considers that an attempt to create an uncertain term creates only a freehold life estate, not a term of 
years for life. The estate created is therefore not within section 149(6). Instead, it seems that that the 
conversion of uncertain terms to life estates was abolished as a consequence of the impossibility of 
creating freehold life estates in section 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925. Second, rather than a rule 
that a lease which failed for uncertainty could be a life estate, the actual rule of construction was that 
a grant for a certain term denied the possibility of a freehold, whether in fee or for life. Third, the 
reasoning in Berrisford focuses on livery of seisin simply as a “formality” requirement (ibid. at, e.g., 
[25] (Lord Neuberger), [89] (Lady Hale)) which could be abolished (ibid. at [41] (Lord Neuberger), 
referring impliedly to Real Property Act 1845, s. 3, requiring a deed in addition to livery of seisin and 
Law of Property Act 1925, s. 51, abolishing livery of seisin). As Kaye notes, in the medieval period, 
livery of seisin was needed to make it “clear that some sort of freehold was meant to be given” (Kaye, 
Medieval English Conveyances, p.241) and so was essential for the conferral of a freehold life estate. 
When one understands that seisin was a substantive right, one realises that the reasoning in the 
Supreme Court is like suggesting that giving possession in a lease is merely a “formality” 
requirement, rather than the conferral of an essential element of the estate itself. Further incisive 
historical criticism of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mexfield can be found in J. Roche, 
“Constitutional land law: Mexfield and the 40-shilling freehold” in W. Barr (ed.), Modern Studies in 
Property Law: Vol 8 (Oxford 2015), ch. 16.  
37 In relation to wills, the rule was abolished by the Wills Act 1837, s. 28.  
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II. UNCERTAIN TERMS AND ESTATES IN LAND 
While an explanation based on construction no longer justifies the certainty of term 
rule, another aspect of medieval land law could provide an explanation for the 
requirement that a lease is for a certain term, an explanation which remains valid 
today. That is the nature of the rights which owners of land hold as owners of estates 
in land, rather than owners of the land itself. It is the system of estates in land which 
explains why a perpetual lease cannot be created. The argument of this section is 
that all estates in land are temporally limited. A perpetual term, or an uncertain term 
which may last forever, not only raises concerns about nemo dat as outlined above, 
but also causes considerable practical problems in relation to such limited estates.  
 
The Temporary Nature of Estates in Land. 
The description of estates in land as “four-dimensional” clearly identifies the role of 
time in defining estates.38 The temporal element is clear in estates for life and for 
leases for a certain term, but estates in fee are also so limited. While the fee simple 
estate has been described as the only perpetual estate known to the common law, 
this is incorrect.39 The fee simple always was, and remains in English law, an estate 
which can end. The common law doctrine of estates recognises no perpetual rights in 
land. At best the fee simple estate is potentially perpetual, a crucially important 
distinction.  
Medieval and early-modern lawyers understood this point very well. An 
attempt to grant land “forever” failed to convey a fee simple.40 A fee simple was a 
grant of land “to X and his heirs”.41 If X died without heirs, or his line of heirs ended 
at any point, the fee simple estate would end and the land escheat to the feudal lord, 
                                                     
38 Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen [1999] 1 A.C. 313 at 317 per Lord Hoffmann.  
39 Western Australia v Ward [2002] HCA 28 at [432].  
40 There is a good demonstration of this difficulty in a commentary on Littleton by the Elizabethan 
lawyer William Fleetwood (British Library Manuscript Harley 5225, f.14).  
41 Littleton §1 (p.1).   
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now more or less invariably the Crown. A fee simple was therefore not an estate to 
be granted by the word “forever”. Escheat for want of heirs was abolished by the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925, which instead provides that if a person dies 
without any heir entitled to receive their estate, the Crown takes the property as bona 
vacantia.42 However, escheat does still arise, principally in two contexts. The first is 
insolvency. If an individual’s trustee in bankruptcy or a company’s liquidator 
exercises his statutory power to disclaim the land, the land will escheat.43 The second 
is the dissolution of a company.44 If an English company is dissolved, the company’s 
property will pass to the Crown as bona vacantia.45 The Crown may disclaim the 
property, at which point escheat occurs.46 If a foreign company is dissolved, escheat 
occurs automatically.47 The Explanatory Notes to the Land Registration Act 2002 
observe that 300-500 cases of escheat occur every year, a figure which remains 
accurate.48 The perpetual fee simple therefore remains unknown to the common law. 
As a consequence, the owner of land in fee simple cannot grant a perpetual right in 
land: nemo dat quod non habet. 
                                                     
42 Administration of Estates Act 1925, ss. 45(1)(d) and 46.  
43 Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 315 and 178, applied in Scmlla Properties Ltd v Gesso Properties (BVI) Ltd 
[1995] BCC 793. It is arguable that this is not a form of escheat as temporal limitation, in that it is not a 
situation where the tenant in fee simple ceases to exist (F.W. Hardman, “The Law of Escheat” (1888) 4 
L.Q.R. 318 at 326-7). Insolvency law was also unknown for much of English legal history.  
44 Coke’s extra-judicial view that a fee simple estate granted to a corporation does not escheat, but 
rather reverts to the grantor seems to have been rightly rejected by the Privy Council in Armbrister v 
Lightbourn [2012] UKPC 40; [2013] 1 P. & C.R. 17 at para.[41], following the strong criticism of that 
view in Re Wells [1933] Ch. 29, especially by Lawrence LJ at 54-55. 
45 Companies Act 2006, s. 1012.  
46 Companies Act 2006, s. 1013.  
47 Re Wells [1933] Ch. 29 at 54-55.  
48 Land Registration Act 2002, Explanatory Notes, at [133], confirmed as still accurate by the Crown 
Estate in an e-mail to the author, 31 January 2014. According to the Crown Estate, in the financial year 
2012-13 there were 776 instances of escheat in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. This figure is 
higher than normal and affected by the use of escheat in personal insolvencies in Northern Ireland 
when the property in question was in negative equity. For an example of the application of escheat in 
a case of personal insolvency in Northern Ireland, see Ulster Bank v Dynes [2012] N.I.Ch. 29. The 
Crown Estate suspects that they do not learn of all dissolutions of foreign companies, such that the 
actual number of escheats may be higher than the figures given here, e-mail to the author, 31 January 
2014. 
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The role of the nemo dat principle was recognised by the House of Lords in 
Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust.49 In that case, the House of Lords 
recognised that in relation to the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, a ”lease” existed 
between individuals in the relationship of landlord and tenant. This was the case 
despite the “landlord” having only a licence, and therefore no estate out of which a 
leasehold estate could be granted. The case remains controversial, precisely because 
commentators identify the case as one which breaches the nemo dat principle.50 
Nevertheless, Lord Hoffmann did acknowledge the nemo dat issue, observing that a 
“lease may, and usually does, create a proprietary interest called a leasehold estate 
or, technically, a ‘term of years absolute.’ This will depend upon whether the 
landlord had an interest out of which he could grant it. Nemo dat quod non habet.”51 
The real criticism of commentators is therefore that Lord Hoffmann seemed to draw 
a distinction between the concept of a “lease” and a “leasehold estate”.52 Both the 
House of Lords and academic writers recognise the importance of nemo dat when 
considering estates in land.53 That nemo dat logic applies to prevent the creation of 
any genuinely perpetual rights in land.  
 
Temporary Estates and Leaseholds 
The nature of estates as temporally limited and how this affects leaseholds is 
something the common law has addressed, especially before the Law of Property 
Act 1925 limited the available estates to the fee simple and term of years.  
                                                     
49 [2000] 1 A.C. 406.  
50 E.g. S. Bright, “Leases, exclusive possession and estates” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 7, at 8.  
51 Bruton at 415.  
52 For criticism in this vein, see Bright, “Leases, exclusive possession”, p. 9 and Dixon, “The non-
proprietary lease: the rise of the feudal phoenix” (2000) 59 C.L.J. 25, at 27-8. This type of distinction is 
not without precedent. In the mid-twentieth century, Megarry similarly distinguished between a 
“lease” and the “leasehold interest” (R.E. Megarry, A Manual of the Law of Real Property, revised 
impression (London 1949), 352).  
53 Nemo dat reasoning also lies behind Lord Templeman’s explanation for the proprietary effect of 
negative freehold covenants in Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 A.C. 310.   
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Modern lawyers are still familiar with the problem of temporally limited 
estates in relation to the grant of subleases.  A leaseholder cannot grant a sublease 
for longer than his own estate in the land. If he or she tries to do so, the principle in 
Milmo v Carreras applies and the grant of the sublease will take effect as a disposition 
of the head lease.54 The operation of Milmo v Carreras looks like an application of 
nemo dat in the context of temporally limited property rights: the owner of the head 
lease cannot give more than he or she has, but the attempt to do so operates as a 
conveyance of all that the grantor does have.  
The same problem was also addressed in relation to other estates in land 
before 1925, albeit never in an entirely consistent fashion. The relationship between 
different kinds of temporal estates caused difficulties. Term of years estates lasted 
for a period determined solely by the inexorable passage of time, but the duration of 
freehold estates depended upon human longevity and reproduction, and was 
consequently unpredictable.55 To resolve that difficulty, the law could either simply 
bar term of years estates as inconsistent with freehold estates for life or in tail or 
allow the term of years, but have rules affecting how such leaseholds were affected 
by the end of the freehold estate. The first possibility would render leasehold estates 
impossible, but given that such grants were allowed, it is unsurprising that medieval 
law instead developed rules to accommodate the relationship between leaseholds 
and freehold estates. These rules allowed for the creation of leaseholds, but also 
prevented the freeholder in possession for the time being from burdening the land 
with leasehold estates in the event that the relevant freehold estate came to an end.  
An owner of a freehold life estate was unable to create leases that endured 
beyond his death, unless a power to grant such rights had been expressly granted 
with the life estate. If such a lease was granted, it terminated on the death of the life 
                                                     
54 [1946] K.B. 306. The various “exceptions” to the rule all arise where the head lease may endure 
beyond the sub-tenancy, confirming that the underlying justification lies in the nemo dat principle (see 
A. Hill-Smith, “The principle in Milmo v Carreras: when the term of a sub-lease equals or exceeds 
that of the head lease” [2013] Conveyancer 509 at 510-511).  
55 As Bracton put it “though nothing is more certain than death nothing is more uncertain than the 
hour of death” (Bracton, vol.2, p.92).  
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tenant.56 In cases of grants of land in fee tail, if a lease was granted and the fee tail 
determined before the lease ended, the lease was voidable by the reversioner.57 The 
life estate and fee tail did not resolve the problem of leasehold estates enduring 
beyond the legal estate in precisely the same manner, but in both cases it is clear that 
a leasehold could not be relied upon to survive the end of the freehold estate. As a 
consequence, the freeholder in possession could not burden the reversioner with 
leasehold estates over the land, unless (in the case of life estates) the reversioner or 
his predecessor in title had expressly authorised such burdens.  
This problem also seems to have been an issue for term of years estates 
granted out of a fee simple. The sixteenth century writer Antony Fitzherbert refers to 
a “doubt” about the availability of the writ quare ejecit infra terminum against a feudal 
lord taking land on escheat.58 For Fitzherbert, it was uncertain whether a tenant had 
access to the quare ejecit writ used by leaseholders against the owner in fee simple.59 
If the tenant did not have access to that writ, then the tenant had no remedy against 
the lord claiming the land on escheat. In effect, the tenant’s term of years estate 
would cease to have legal effect. The “doubt” is unsurprisingly imprecise, but the 
leasehold estate being either void or voidable would be consistent with quare ejecit 
not being available. But if the writ were available, then it seems that a feudal tenant 
could bind the feudal lord with a contractual arrangement between the feudal tenant 
and a leasehold tenant. That is now the case in English law; cases from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries establish that the term of years estate does 
survive the end of the fee simple estate by escheat.60 This suggests a further 
explanation for the certainty of term requirement, one grounded in the doctrine of 
estates and addressing the problem of the freehold estate ending while the leasehold 
                                                     
56 Smith v Widlake (1877) 3 C.P.D. 10.  
57 Earl of Bedford’s Case (1586) 7 Co.Rep. 7; 77 ER 421.  
58 A. Fitzherbert, The New Natura Brevium of the Most Reverend Judge Mr Anthony Fitz-Herbert (London: 
A. Strathan and W. Woodfall, 1794), vol.2, p.198 (first printed in 1534).  
59 Quare eject infra terminum was available for ejections of the tenant during the leasehold against the 
landlord, including successors in title of the original landlord.  
60 Scmlla Properties at 806-808.  
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estate persists. Unlike the approach to construction found in Bracton, this justification 
for the rule retains validity in modern English law, although it was more significant 
in medieval law.  
Medieval English law was uncomfortable with the possibility of a feudal lord 
being effectively deprived of their rights to the land without their consent. Such a 
concern lay behind the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum 1290.61 Grants into mortmain 
were an example of the problem, whereby a tenant in fee simple conveyed their land 
to an immortal corporation, preventing any possibility of escheat.62 Grants in tail, 
which were grants in fee and consequently might never come to an end, also seem to 
have been problematic, with such grants generally not being capable of creating fee 
tail estates (rather than conditional fee simple estates) until the statute de donis 
conditionalibus was construed as requiring that conclusion.63 The same concern could 
lie behind the certainty of term rule. If a perpetual term of years were granted and 
bound the lord on escheat of the fee simple, that would effectively deprive the feudal 
lord of any benefit from the escheat, just as it would probably render the value of 
wardship and other feudal incidents negligible, especially if the term of years were 
granted for a large initial payment, rather than regular rent. An uncertain term faces 
the same difficulties: if the determining condition never arises, then the leasehold 
estate will continue indefinitely, depriving the feudal lord of the benefits of his 
lordship.  
Modern law is unconcerned with the benefits of feudal lordship of land.64 
However, the possibility of escheat continues to cause difficulties in relation to 
leasehold estates generally, and particularly hypothetical leasehold estates of 
uncertain duration. At present, if escheat occurs, interests which grant rights of 
possession of the land (such as leases and mortgages) survive the determination of 
                                                     
61 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, p.242.  
62 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, p.241.  
63 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, pp.272-4.   
64 For the undermining and abolition of such rights, see Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 
p.257.  
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the fee simple estate. These interests continue after escheat, but are time limited. If 
leases for an uncertain term were permitted, the owner in fee simple could 
potentially deny the Crown possession of the land in perpetuity. In itself this may 
seem fairly uncontroversial; the Crown obtains a windfall through escheat and if the 
Crown does not really obtain a benefit, but simply acts as a long-stop to ensure that 
someone has a superior right so that the landlord and tenant relationship is 
maintained, so be it.  
However, the interaction of leases and escheat is complicated and doctrinally 
awkward. Potentially perpetual leases would render it even more so. When escheat 
occurs, the Crown’s title comes into effect immediately, but no liability arises in 
relation to the land unless and until the Crown enters or brings proceedings in 
relation to the land.65 Until such action is undertaken, there is neither privity of 
contract nor privity of estate between the lord and the tenant and so the normal 
leasehold covenants do not apply. This explains why the Crown Estate’s position is 
that “[w]e are…not responsible for ownerless land or what happens to it. We will 
not manage, insure, repair or look after it. We do not have the usual responsibilities 
of a landowner.”66 The term of years estate which remains is consequently rather 
peculiar. The “landlord” is not liable under the landlord covenants, but equally will 
not enforce the tenant covenants either.67 The operation of escheat therefore 
undermines the contractual obligations integrated into the leasehold estate and there 
is a serious risk that for a lease to exist in perpetuity or potentially in perpetuity 
would be to risk sterilising the use of the land in precisely the manner raised as 
problematic by Gray and Gray.68  
A further difficulty arises in the administration of escheat. When escheat 
occurs, the Crown Estate will seek to grant a new fee simple estate to an 
                                                     
65 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1766), vol.2, 
p.245; Scmlla Properties at 804-5.  
66 http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/our-business/faqs/escheats-faqs/ (accessed 25 May 2015).  
67 Hardman, “The Law of Escheat”, p.329.   
68 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, p.325.  
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“appropriate buyer”, which it identifies as someone with “a genuine interest in the 
future use or condition of the ownerless land, or [who] had an interest in the former 
owner (if it was a company or other similar organisation)”. This would be difficult 
were escheat land subject to a potentially indefinite leasehold estate. Presumably the 
tenant of the leasehold estate has a “genuine interest” in the future use of the land. 
But so might someone with an interest in any former owner. In the event of there 
being more than one possible appropriate buyer, there is little that can be done to 
resolve the situation. The Crown Estate simply states that it “may expect” possible 
appropriate buyers to discuss the matter between themselves. Furthermore, as the 
Crown Estate observes, even as the law currently stands, “[t]he complicated nature 
of this part of the law means that in case of doubt or possible risk, we may decide 
not to sell, even if there are appropriate buyers willing to pay best price.”69 Quite 
how this would be resolved in situations of potentially perpetual leases is unknown, 
and allowing uncertain terms would add a further layer of complexity to the 
process.  
 
III. ABOLISHING THE CERTAINTY RULE 
The explanations presented here for the certainty of term rule are not 
insurmountable. Even in medieval England Wonnacott identifies four distinct 
exceptions, albeit no longer applied: tenancies by statute merchant, statute staple 
and elegit, and leases granted to an executor to pay debts.70 The first three gave a 
right to possession of a debtor’s land to creditors, as a means to raise money to pay 
                                                     
69 http://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/our-business/faqs/escheats-faqs/ (accessed 25 May 2015). Quite 
what would constitute “best price” would also be problematic. While actuarial calculations can be 
used when valuing a life interest, it seems less likely that an actuary would be able to provide 
calculations about some of the uncertain terms which appear in the cases, such as requiring land for 
road-widening or the date of the Second World War ending.  
70 M. Wonnacott, History of the Law of Landlord and Tenant (Clark N.J. 2012), p.144. It is questionable 
whether these rights to land were always regarded as creating a lease situation or whether the 
language of “tenancy” should be thought of as reflecting the idea of feudal tenancy. For discussion 
about the complicated nature of the tenancy by statute merchant, see C. McNall, “The Nature of the 
Tenancy by Statute Merchant” (2002) 23 Journal of Legal History 37-44. 
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the outstanding debts. Once the debts were discharged, the right to possession came 
to an end. These three forms of “tenancy” were created by statute in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries.71 Leases for executors to pay debts, or raise a certain sum 
of money, were acknowledged as sufficiently certain in early-modern cases, 
seemingly as reflecting earlier practice.72 Whether these terms truly were “uncertain” 
is open to question. All of these exceptions to the rule were for uncertain, but 
defined periods. Lawyers recognised the period as one which would definitely come 
to an end.73 Land would yield an income and so could raise a specified sum of 
money. In relation to debts, the charging of any interest was unlawful until 1545, so 
there was no possibility of the debt growing.74 The money raised from the land 
would, necessarily, discharge the debt eventually. While the term was not certain in 
the sense usually accepted, it would certainly come to an end.  
Nevertheless, the grant of a truly perpetual lease has been made possible by 
statute in various jurisdictions and there is no reason to consider it impossible here.75 
Parliament could, of course, create and authorise such leases, doing something 
which looks “pretty odd” as a matter of doctrine.76 Such was the case in Wotherspoon 
v Canadian Pacific Ltd, where the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada appeared 
                                                     
71 Tenancy by statute merchant in the Statute of Merchants 1285 (13 Edw.1.stat.3); tenancy by statute 
staple in the Statute of the Staple 1353 (27 Edw.3. stat.2, c.9) and tenancy by elegit in the Statute of 
Westminster II 1285 (13 Edw.1. c.18).  
72 For leases to pay debts: Blamford v Blamford (1615) 3 Bulstrode 98 at 100; 81 E.R. 84 at 86, obiter per 
Coke CJ. For leases to raise a certain sum of money, Sir Andrew Corbet’s Case (1599) 4 Co.Rep. 81b at 
81b-82a; 76 E.R. 1058 at 1059.  
73 For the tenancy by statute merchant, see Thomas Fitzwilliam’s reading in 1466, referring to “the 
certainty of their term” (a reading on the Statute of Merton 1236 in S.E. Thorne (ed.), Readings and 
Moots at the Inns of Court in the Fifteenth Century, vol.1 (London: Selden Society vol.71, 1952), p.44). In 
relation to executors, in Sir Andrew Corbet’s Case ((1599) 4 Co.Rep. 81b at 81b-82a; 76 E.R. 1058 at 1059) 
there was discussion about the term coming to an end when the requisite sum has been raised, or 
would have been raised if the executors had collected it, preventing executors from extending the 
duration of the tenancy and showing that the end of the tenancy was seen as a predictable (and hence 
certain) event. Analogies are drawn to tenancy by elegit and statute merchant, to which the same rules 
seem to have applied (on which see McNall, “The Nature of the Tenancy”, p.41).  
74 Stat.37.Hen.8.c.9.  
75 E.g. Australia (Fisher v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Land Tax (NSW) (1915) 20 C.L.R. 242 at 248-9) 
and Canada (Wotherspoon v Canadian Pacific Ltd (1987) 39 D.L.R. (4th) 169 at 205-6).  
76 City of London v Wood (1701) 12 Mod. 669 at 687-688; 88 E.R. 1592 at 1602.  
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relieved that the statutory basis of a perpetual lease meant they were not required to 
place such leases within the established doctrinal structure.77 If such a perpetual 
lease were acceptable, then it seems impossible to justify maintaining the certainty of 
term rule, which operates to bar potentially perpetual estates.  
If the argument presented here is correct, the certainty of term rule has 
foundations in wider principles of property law and simple abolition would be 
doctrinally awkward.78 A better approach would be to remove the doctrinal 
underpinning of the rule by recognising the fee simple as a genuinely perpetual 
estate in land with the corresponding abolition of the doctrine of escheat.79 There 
would then be no inherent objection to a lease with an uncertain term, even a 
perpetual lease, based on the internal logic of the real property system.80  
Despite its doctrinal logic, the current law of escheat causes problems akin to 
those of uncertainty of title. While a leaseholder of land subject to an escheat 
definitely does have title, it is in effect unenforceable, creating considerable practical 
uncertainty about the rights and obligations of the tenant. Such practical 
uncertainties about title and the relative rights of individuals to property are 
understandably not encouraged in English property law. Adverse possession of land 
and relativity of title for chattels both strive towards certainty, albeit in different 
ways.81 Similarly, an adjudicator at the Land Registry has recognised that it is better 
that land should be “owned than left in limbo”.82 As the Court of Appeal have 
                                                     
77 (1987) 39 D.L.R. (4th) 169 at 205.  
78 Australian perpetual leases are granted by the Crown, which does not grant them out of a fee 
simple estate.  
79 There may also be further benefits in such a change, see C. Harpum, “Does feudalism have a role in 
21st century land law?” (2000) 23 Amicus Curiae 21, 23-25.  
80 This does not mean perpetual or uncertain terms would be desirable, simply that one objection to 
such terms would be overcome. Other objections, rooted in policy, would still remain.  
81 On adverse possession’s continuing justifications in registered land, see The Law Commission, Land 
Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document (Law Com., No. 254, 1998), at 10.13-
10.16.  
82 Walker v Burton [2012] EWHC 978 (Ch), at [16]. The quoted text is from a decision made by a deputy 
adjudicator to the Land Registry.  
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observed, “continuing uncertainty” is not desirable.83 The current system of escheat 
causes a state of uncertainty in practice.  
The Law Commission has described the current law of escheat as 
“indefensible” and in need of “fundamental reform”.84 The effect of escheat on the 
certainty of term rule, about which there is considerable judicial dissatisfaction, gives 
another reason for doing so. The Law Commission had expressed a desire to review 
feudal land law, and in doing so would necessarily have considered escheat and by 
consequence the certainty of term rule. The Northern Irish Law Commission also 
proposed abolishing escheat.85 However, reform of feudal land law is no longer part 
of the English Law Commission’s programme.86  
Scots law abolished escheat over a decade ago and does not seem to have 
experienced problems as a result.87 English practice in relation to land is already 
reducing the significance of escheat, both in the general rules and specific contexts. 
In theory, when escheat occurs, the fee simple estate comes to an end. This poses 
serious problems for registration of title, especially as subordinate interests on the 
                                                     
83 Walker v Burton [2013] EWCA Civ 1228, [2014] 1 P. & C.R. 9, at [102]. The High Court was more 
sceptical, but regarded the “limbo” point as a technical one about genuinely ownerless property 
([2012] EWHC 978 (Ch), at [111]-[112]), rather than taking the approach of the Court of Appeal, that 
“limbo” referred to uncertainty about, rather than absence of, ownership of the land.  
84 The Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Conveyancing Revolution (Law 
Com., No. 271, 2001), at 11.26 and 11.27.  
85 Northern Ireland Law Commission, Consultation Paper Land Law (NILC 2, 2009), at 2.17. Their final 
proposals, however, would not address the issue relating to certainty of term. Following concerns 
raised by the Treasury Solicitor, the Northern Ireland Law Commission proposed abolition of escheat 
in a manner which would continue to allow the Crown to continue to avoid liability in relation to 
leaseholds over escheat land (Northern Ireland Law Commission, Report on Land Law (NILC 8, 2010), 
at 2.10-2.13).  
86 Any reference to feudal land law is missing from the Law Commission’s twelfth programme (The 
Law Commission, Twelfth Programme of Law Reform (Law Com., No. 354, 2014)), following a decision 
in the eleventh programme that greater public benefit would flow from other projects (The Law 
Commission, Eleventh Programme of Law Reform (Law Com., No. 330, 2011), at 3.2-3.3). It seems that 
public benefit assessments can in fact defend the “indefensible”. For further discussion of continuing 
feudal elements in English land law and the difficulties of their interaction with land registration, see 
E. Nugee, “The feudal system and the Land Registration Acts” (2008) 124 L.Q.R. 586.  
87 Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) 2000 ss.2 and 58. See the explanatory notes, paras.[24] 
and [189]. The Crown in Scotland has a prerogative right to bona vacantia which is expressly 
unaffected by the abolition of feudal tenure (s.58(2)(b)(i)). The relevant law is discussed in Re The 
Scottish Environmental Protection Agency [2013] C.S.I.H. 108, [104]-[109].  
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estate are not determined on escheat, but enter a curious limbo state.88 The 
registration system accommodates these interests by not removing the relevant fee 
simple title from the register, despite its non-existence as a matter of orthodox 
property principles.89  
Escheat remains possible when a trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator disclaims 
the land, when a foreign company is dissolved or when the Crown obtains land as 
bona vacantia from a dissolved company and then itself disclaims the land.90 
However, the Companies Act 2006 features provisions making the escheat of 
property obtained as bona vacantia from dissolved companies less likely. Under 
section 1017, anyone with an interest in the disclaimed property, or a liability in 
relation to it, may apply to the court for an order vesting the property in someone 
entitled to it or a person subject to such a liability on such conditions as the court 
thinks fit.91 Special provision is made in section 1016 to ensure that any tenants or 
subtenants of disclaimed land are notified of the disclaimer, which does not take 
effect until such notice has been served, which enables such individuals to apply to 
the court under section 1017. A tenant can then apply to acquire the fee simple, 
rather than an escheat occurring.  
These provisions reduce (but do not remove) the risk of an unowned fee 
simple reversion. In many respects they replicate current practice in escheat, as the 
Crown Estate seeks to grant a new fee simple by finding an appropriate buyer, but 
do so through a clear statutory and judicial process.92 In the context of land held by 
                                                     
88 See above, text at nn.65-68.  
89 Authorised by Land Registration Act 2002, s. 82 (especially s.82(2)(b)) and implemented by Land 
Registration Rules 2003, r. 173(1).  
90 See above, nn.43-47.  
91 Companies Act 2006, s. 1017(4). Such conditions can include the payment of money, although it 
seems likely that if a fee simple were subject to a perpetual or potentially perpetual leasehold estate, 
any such payment would be very low.  
92 One of the benefits of escheat is that, like relativity of title, it avoids a possible proprietary vacuum. 
The current position, where the Crown Estate may decline to grant a new fee simple in difficult 
situations (see above, text at n.69) undermines this benefit. Replacing the role of the Crown Estate 
with the court seems likely to encourage resolution in such difficult situations, although it must be 
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the Crown as bona vacantia from dissolved British companies, the role of escheat has 
consequently been minimised. A modified version of this approach could work more 
generally. If the courts were to ensure that someone is vested with the property, the 
major benefit of escheat in insolvency and to the Crown, that it prevents liability for 
outstanding obligations is not lost, but neither does the property become truly 
ownerless.93 Someone other than the insolvent person or the Crown will be vested 
with the land and the obligations. An addition to the Companies Act scheme, taken 
from the current practice in escheat, would also be useful: that the land could be 
given to someone with an interest in the former owner, where that former owner 
was a company.94 This would prevent the transfer of land subject to onerous burdens 
to a company, for it then to pass to the Crown on the company’s dissolution.95 This 
approach would also accord with the attitude of the courts, as judges seem to try and 
avoid findings of bona vacantia and would rather someone hold the property.96 If the 
court were to reallocate property as bona vacantia, rather than the land escheat, a 
principled and practical objection to perpetual or potentially perpetual leaseholds 
would itself come to an end.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
acknowledged that section 1017 of the Companies Act only states that a court “may” make a vesting 
order, so the court is not required to do so.  
93 Examples of situations where the Crown chooses to disclaim bona vacantia to avoid such liabilities 
include: property in negative equity, property subject to onerous covenants and contaminated land 
(see https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/bona-vacantia-dissolved-companies-bvc1/bona-
vacantia-dissolved-companies-bvc1#disclaimers (accessed 25 May 2015)). All of these situations might 
also apply when a decision is made to disclaim in insolvency, e.g. Ulster Bank v Dynes [2012] N.I.Ch. 
29 (property in negative equity) and J. Stephens, “Environmental considerations in pending 
insolvency proceedings” (2010) 5 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 202 (contaminated land). My 
thanks to Riz Mokal for discussion on the contaminated land point.  
94 See above, text at n.69.  
95 This problem was noted in relation to forfeiture under the mortmain legislation by Earl Jowitt in 
Attorney-General v Parsons [1956] A.C. 421, 435.  
96 E.g. Hanchett-Stamford v Attorney General [2008] EWHC (Ch) 330, [2009] Ch. 173, at [37] and [47], 
where Lewison J rejected the view that the assets of an unincorporated association with only one 
surviving member were bona vacantia for the Crown, describing such a position as a “divesting” of the 
remaining member and invoking the guarantee of peaceful enjoyment of possession found in Article 
1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights. In Re DWS [2001] Ch. 568, the 
majority of the Court of Appeal also avoided finding that property passed as bona vacantia under the 
Administration of Estates Act 1925. Interestingly, the only judge (Sedley LJ) to support a finding of 
bona vacantia did so seemingly on the premise that the Crown would make an ‘equitable’ payment to 
someone not entitled under the statute but otherwise deserving (paras. [39] and [41]).  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The rule against uncertain terms can be seen as based upon the place of leaseholds 
within the system of estates in land, especially the “fourth dimension” of such 
estates, as limited in time. To avoid problems, any attempt to allow uncertain 
leasehold estates needs to address this difficulty. Abolition of one of the last vestiges 
of feudalism in English land law, the escheat of freehold land, would ensure that a 
justification for the prohibition of uncertain or perpetual leasehold estates based 
upon the internal logic of the system of estates in land would end.  
 
Whether this would be desirable as a matter of policy is a rather different question. 
Abolishing escheat would itself change the nature of the fee simple estate, but the 
nature of the freehold as reversion would also change dramatically if the freeholder 
might never regain physical possession of the land. English law is generally 
concerned about the separation of enjoyment of land from the legal ownership of it. 
Avoiding that situation is a continuing justification for adverse possession, even in 
registered land,97 and section 153 of the Law of Property Act 1925 reflects it, with the 
potential for long leases to be enlarged into fee simple estates. Understanding the 
feudal underpinning of the certainty rule brings such issues to the fore, focusing on 
policy by freeing the law from feudalism.  
 
 
                                                     
97 The Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document, at 
10.13 and 10.15.  
